Annus Horribilis by Brendan Gleeson
Less mystery, more imagination: the future of the City of London
Introduction
In this commentary I want to speculate abut the longer term future of the City of
London. This is not an easy thing to do. For one thing, the City's 250000 or so workers
(of whom about 195000 are employed in the Square Mile and another 55000 elsewhere
in Greater London) are employed in a remarkably diverse set of activitiesöall the way
from law to LIFFE. For another, commentators on its future have tended to become
fixated on the cost to the City of remaining outside the Eurozone.
Of course, there can be little doubt that if Britain stays outside the Euro it will have
an impact on the City's future growth. After all, as many as a quarter of all the jobs in
the City depend on the EU in one form or another (either depending on customers
from other EU economies, or on businesses owned by other EU companies, or on
transactions taking place in EU-based instruments and currencies, and 45% of foreign
banks in the City are owned by European financial institutions). It is no surprise, then,
that, on one estimate, the costs of remaining outside the Eurozone might be the loss of
about 20000 City jobs, or around 0.1% of UK GDP (London Development Partner-
ship, 1999). But many of these lost jobs would not end up in other EU financial
centresöthey would go to New York or they would simply disappear, a consequence
of the higher costs of doing business away from the City. And, currently at least, the
City has also picked up a lot of Euro business. In other words, the overall impact is
currently indeterminate, may be high but equally could be quite small.
In this commentary I want to argue that all the brouhaha about the Euro is
diverting attention from deeper and just as fundamental concerns about the future of
the City of London, and, most especially, the rise of a global information economy. My
argument is that the City has other things it should be worried about as well as the
Euro and probably rather more worried about, which the furore over the Euro makes it
too easy to forget.
The shorter term
In the shorter term, I doubt that a serious problem exists. As much research shows,
generally speaking the City is competitive, relative to other financial centres, it does not
seem to be losing much business as a result of the Euro (indeed, it may have gained it),
and it probably has the prospect of even happier times ahead (Centre for Economics and
Business Research,1998; London Development Partnership,1999). For example, in parts
of Europe such as Germany and the Netherlands institutional investors will increasingly
have to fund growing pension liabilities by investing more heavily in stock markets and
by helping to fund European mergers and acquisitions. While this may not equate to a
wave of money crashing onto the City it should do very nicely. So I think that the City's
immediate future, give or take an American financial crash, is secure enough.We won't
suddenly see an exodus of jobs, skills and investment to Frankfurtöor New York.
The longer term
But longer termöfive or more likely ten years on from nowöI think there may be
troubles ahead. I want to fix on two of these troubles. One is New York. Currently
there are in effect only two major international financial centres: London and New
York. If there is a real source of competition for London, it is from New York, for a
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run on North American lines to North American protocols. The international reg-
ulatory framework therefore favours New York before it does London. Second, North
American firms are, by and large, the key players in the international financial
system. Although they have a strong allegiance to London currently, this can be
withdrawn. Third, new forms of communication both make it easier for direct
competition to take place and also make it easier to compete around the world
from the United States, without needing to use other financial centres. Fourth, in
any case, it could be argued that New York is closer to where the global economic
action isöthe so-called `new economy' which everyone is struggling to come to
terms with. Fifth, the US capital markets are increasingly attracting international
interestöthey are, after all, highly liquid and companies listed on them can attract
funds easily. And, sixth and last, competition between London and New York,
though sometimes fierce, is nowhere near as fierce as it could be. What if New
York really decided to compete for London's business, using especially a variety of
electronic means, in a way it has only done fitfully up until now?
Then there is one other trouble on the horizon.This is information and communica-
tions technology (ICT). In retail finance, ICT has already produced enormous
changeöfrom new entrants to new ways of dealing with clients to sloughing off
branches at warp speedöand a second wave of change is now beginning to break.
You do not have to be a `Hewitt babe', reading only Wired and Fast Company, to see
that. For example, it will not be long before a considerable amount of current call centre
activity is run by voice-activated software with obvious consequencesöone recent
estimate is that 40% of current call centre employment will disappear over the next
ten yearsöand it would not be surprising to see some of the financial call centre activity
that is left being displaced to countries like India as bank and other financial institu-
tions pursue lower costs. Again, it cannot be long before intelligent agents, operating on
the Internet, begin to threaten some of the activities of financial intermediaries and
drive new products, especially as new text-recognition software appears. It surely
cannot be long, either, before customers start to auction off their personal data to
intermediaries for selling on rather than giving it out for free. By contrast, in certain
ways, what is remarkable about international finance, is how limited the impacts of
ICT have been, given the massive investments in them: automation of bank offices,
faster communications and data transfer, information services, program trading, risk
management, some new derivative products.
Yet, in other ways, we can also see that an enormous change is slowly coming
about; a second wave just as in retail finance. That is that the form of money is
changing as a result of the application of the prodigious amounts of ICT which are
producing a global information economy. As money becomes information etched
into computer memories, so the source of profit from money is gradually moving
away from exchangeöfrom the marketsöwhich, in turn, are becoming much less
dependent on location as they are able to transact in many places. Instead, profit will
increasingly be made up and down the value chain as money comes to be seen as just
another commodityölike chocolate or potatoes. In turn, the City will have to learn
to thrive to an even greater extent by reinforcing or creating new high-value-added
locations up and down this chain, and in particular by creating and manipulating
information products, undoubtedly bolstered by the base provided by London's extra-
ordinary telecommunications and skills structures but still with much work to do.
What was peripheral will become central. We can already start to see how new
sources of profit are going to be produced by this transition from money as fact to
money as process. For example:
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the City as indexed by, for example, the rapid growth in IT specialists and the general
upgrading of IT skills (Rajan et al, 1998). There is some evidence, that, in turn, this IT
expertise is producing a cluster of IT firms in and around the City (Local Futures
Group, 1999) whose importance relates especially to the production of financial soft-
ware which must be one of the key drivers of the City in the future.
2. High-quality information productionThe City has always depended upon information:
stories about what is happening, often passed on face-to-face, have been its lifeblood.
These stories are, to a great extent, the City's structure of expectations and its exper-
tise. But, increasingly, information has become formalised and so able to be marketed
by data suppliers and other such agencies. A major task for the City must now be to
guarantee this raft of formal informaiton, to make it trustworthy in the ways that face-
to-face knowledge supposedly was. Indeed, there is already talk in the City about
information quality assurance schemes, perhaps guaranteed by the Bank of England.(1)
3. New information markets The City will almost certainly move up as well as down the
value chain, into distribution as monetary information is increasingly distributed
beyond the lucky few. As Peter Drucker (1999) has recently argued, increasing numbers
of relatively affluent middle-class people across Europe want to be active investors and,
with the spread of the Internet, intelligent agents, mobile phone access to the Internet,
and more financial information, will be able to become so. They may not be as exciting
clients as those found in mergers and acquisitions but, as Drucker argues, with the help
of ICT they may turn out to be just as profitable. And, as some consumers begin to
take more responsibility for their investments, so this will have effects for the institu-
tional investors in the City.
These developments are all the more pressing because the Internet and corporate
intranets hold the potential to produce very large decreases in firm costs (and corre-
spondingly lower barriers to entry) which will probably allow larger firms to become
leaner and meaner, but will also allow small firms to offer much greater competition.
Conclusions
And what does all this mean in general terms? Most importantly, the City must pay
more attention to innovation based on a much more explicit conception of knowledge-
based products than has hitherto been in circulation. Less mystery, more imagination.
Though the evidence on rate of innovation in the Cityöin products and processesöis
ambiguous, to say the least, it seems certain that it is less than in New York. And, in
the end, this is the real challenge to the Cityöto generate more ideas more quickly than
other financial centres (Czerniawska, 1999). But the news is mixed. On the one hand,
new and productive crossovers are occurring in London such as that between financial
software and media firms which is in turn producing new modes of visualisation and
control of the global economy. On the other hand, the increasing concentration of City
business in the hands of just a few firms may crowd out diversity. The City, in other
words, may well be on a cusp without realising it. It may become a kind of on-line
financial SiliconValley, or it may be that it is already starting to walk with the dinosaurs.
Nigel Thrift
(1) That this is not necessarily the case at present is shown by the rather different reactions of
London and New York to the Asian financial crisis. In London, according to Clark and Wojcik
(1999), the lack of faith in marketable information (in part because of its relative homogeneity)
meant that the City fell back on fundamentals and the opinions of a few key commentators, so
leading to a passive and pessimistic stance. In New York, where formal information is more
heterogeneous and held in higher regard, this pessimism was less. In other words, the City's
information production needs to be more heterogeneous in terms of the breadth and the depth of
its sources and more tightly quality-assured.
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Annus Horribilis
To them that hath...
Australia, January 1999: a sizzling economic growth rate of 5%; record corporate profit
levels; soaring productivity; a financial sector largely untouched by the Asian crisis;
declining levels of public debt; a national budget in surplus; a consumer spending
spree; low interest rates; and a baby bull stockmarket cantering after its US sibling.
Blue skies beckoned. A dawn chorus of economists heralded the arrival of `good
times'. This time, they carolled, growth was secured: the mistakes of the distant past
(the 1980s) had been learnt from. Painful but necessary reforms had `firewalled' the
economy against the inevitable eruptions of the global trade cycle. The chorusing
continued: just look at how well we weathered the firestorms of the Asian meltdown!
This happy paean neglected storm clouds gathering on the macro-horizon, including
a rapidly worsening current account deficit, ballooning consumer debt, and intractable
unemployment. A few doomsayers pointed to trouble ahead. The head of the National
Institute of Economic Industry and Research, Peter Brain (1999) forecast a looming
US-led slump that would grind the Australian growth rate down to zero levels during
2000. Another economics commentator, Ross Gittins of the Sydney Morning Herald,
knew that universal growth measures masked a myriad of inequalities, remarking dryly,
``To them that hath it shall be given'' (1999). It was an open secret that not all were equal
before the god of Growth. But the doubters were few and the faithful were many.
In1998Prime Minister Howard had famouslydeclared Australiathe new``strongman
of Asia'' (Gordon,1998). Senior government ministers eagerly repeated the same macho
refrain throughout the October1998 national election and beyond. [The appalling choice
of metaphor was apparently lost on conservative leaders, apparently intoxicated by
self-praiseöEast Asia's human rights activities have long characterised the region's
dictatorial states as `strongman' regimes (for example, see Ramos, 1998).] Throughout
late 1998 and early 1999, government ministers, together with a coterie of senior
`economic commentators', swaggered about on the international stage, parading the
strongman, urging him to flex his muscles before bemused global financiers and foreign
states. In braggadocio rich with masculinist anxiety, the newfound muscularity of Asia's
traditional economic `punyman' was celebrated and its sourceöneoliberal reformö
hailed as the tonic of success. Regular homilies from Australian commentators and
politicians sermonised the declawed tigers on the evils of `crony capitalism' and the
virtues of neoliberal governance.
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for two decadesöhad apparently delivered the goods. After decades of `necessary'
pain, the country was told that it was awash with gain. But as the year wore on it
was increasingly apparent that very few people were listening to the good-time tunes
and even fewer were inclined to believe them. The political airwaves resounded with the
blues of exclusion and betrayal.
Spectres at the feast
The grass-roots disenchantment with mainstream politics that rose to prominence in
1999 came as no surprise to many social scientists (especially geographers), welfare
service providers and local politicians. All knew that the growth surge of the late 1990s
had been extracted at an enormous social price. The benefits of expansion have largely
accrued to the already wealthy, exacerbating socioeconomic cleavages. Between 1993
and 1999, ``the share of the nation's wealth held by the richest 10 per cent...increased
by almost five percentage points, from 43.5 per cent to more than 48 per cent...''
(Long, 1999, page 21). Horin writes: ``economic growth has contributed to stress,
inequalities and insecurities'' (1999).
Moreover, the catastrophic ecological cost of growth was increasingly hard to deny.
Vast quantities of nature have been consumed and despoiled in the scramble for riches.
In late 1999 the strongman emerged from the international growth ruckus as the new
global `filthyman': Australians now are the highest emitters per capita of greenhouse
gases in the world (Lawson, 1999).
Two decades of neoliberal economic restructuring have bequeathed new geographies
of advantage and disadvantage, marked by worsening sociospatial polarisation and
intensifying locational disadvantage. The benefits of growth freed up by globalisation,
economic restructuring, and technological change have largely flowed to major metro-
politan areas, whilst the negative impacts of the same changes have been concentrated
in rural zones, regional urban areas, and the outer suburban tracts of the capital cities.
Cutbacks to government social services and infrastructure provision have affected rural,
regional, and outer-suburban communities disproportionately, adding a further source
of disadvantage to structural sources of deprivation. In particular, many outer-suburban
working-class communities have had to bear the dual burdens of high structural
unemployment and locational disadvantage arising from poor access to jobs, services,
and infrastructure.
On the other side of the ledger, Long reports that ``Some 30,000 new jobs have been
created in Sydney's CBD during the past 5 years, 20,000 of them going to professional
women...'' (1999, page 21). The growth of this new group of affluent professionals and
service workers has been mirrored by a concentration of wealth and economic oppor-
tunity in better off residential areas, such as Sydney's North Shore and Harbourside
localities. Brain (1999, page 217) notes that the average household income in Sydney's
high income areas was 45% greater than that of the poorest major groupöthe provin-
cial townsöin 1986, and 83% greater in 1996. Spatial segregation is also worsening
when measured by other social well-being criteriaöincluding occupational grouping,
educational attainment, language skills, and employment status (Hunter and Gregory,
1996; Walmsley and Weinand, 1997).
As 1999 wore on, spectres began to crowd the feast, rattling their political chains in
State and national elections that unseated neoliberal incumbents and governments. The
laments of the invisible and the inconsolable resounded throughout talkback radio, the
local media, and public rallies. Their anger also animated new populist political forces,
such as Pauline Hanson's One Nation party, which registered modest electoral suc-
cesses in 1998^99. (By late 1999, One Nation's political momentum had dissipated,
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Labor candidates.)
The march of the ungrateful dead continued into the year, trampling over every
neoliberal political structure that it encountered. In March a vulnerable Labor govern-
ment in New South Wales was returned with a hugely increased majority against a
conservativeoppositioncommittedtoprivatisingtheState'selectricityinfrastructure.The
Labor Party scored huge gains in unfamiliar rural territory as country voters cast aside
their traditional allegiance tothe conservative National Party. In the months following its
dramatic reelection, it seemed that the Labor government was struggling to understand,
let alone engage, the new regional development agenda that disenchanted voters had
forced upon them. Hardly exultant, State Labor ministers were well aware of the new
electoral volatility that made the future uncertain.
In October the country's most potent and heretofore most popular neoliberal
politicianöJeffrey Kennett, premier of the State of Victoriaöwas felled by a wild
electoral swing. This relentless driver of `crash through' economic reform suddenly
found himself unable to negotiate a shifting electoral course, coming to a spectacular,
fiery political end that stunned the nation (somehow appropriate for a self-styled
`Formula One' government). His government was replaced by a State Labor Party
that immediately broke off its own long engagement with neoliberalism and nervously
embraced a new political desiderata of regional balance, robust state services, public
probity, and inclusive governance.
At the national level, the Victorian and New South Wales election results provoked
a sudden and anxious `outbreak of love' from the iron sentinels of neoliberalism.
Expressions of compassion, leniency, and `sensitivity' to the concerns of disadvantaged
peoples and regions poured forth from every conservative and progressive politician
able to command media airtime. Prime Minister Howard made a public act of con-
trition, meditating humbly that ``there are many people in rural and regional Australia
who are not sharing the national economic plenty'' (ABC News broadcast, 20 October
1999). Belief in locational and regional policies suddenly entered the hearts of con-
servative government ministers who had previously disavowed `geographical cures' as
leftist mumbojumbo. Progressives listenedwith astonishment asTory converts joined the
`geography matters!' refrain. Nervous MPs from rural and regional electorates stepped
forward regularly to recant their prolonged agnosticism on questions spatial. Even the
national government's `Productivity Commission'öneoliberalism's own Congregation
for the Defence of the Faithöwas moved to enter the confessional box, releasing an
inquiry in late 1999 that wept over the hurt that competition policy reforms had caused
rural and regional communities. `Crocodile tears', was the verdict of politics: more
punishment for elites lay just ahead.
We are not amused
On 6 November, two constitutional referenda were convincingly defeated. Though
neither of the two referendum questions polled support for neoliberalism directly, the
electoral geography that patterned the response reveals the spectral force of the dis-
possessed and disenfranchised.Yet again, this new `invisible hand' signalled its rejection
of the `goods' that neoliberal government's and elites have tried to peddle in 1999.
The proposal to create a republic whose president would be appointed through an
indirect election by members of parliament was strongly rejected. National opinion
polls in 1999 revealed that around three quarters of Australians supported severing ties
with Britain and that monarchists were a small, and dwindling, minority.The same polls
showed that grass-roots republicanism was hostile to the idea of an indirectly elected
president (Mackay, 1999). Most republicans were `direct electionists'. An opportunistic
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Constitutional Monarchy') urged a `No' vote throughout the referendum campaign.
The geography of the referendum vote closely traces the new patterns of sociospatial
division. The urban proletariat and people in rural and regional areas rejected the
republican model that was put forward in the referendum. Nearly 55% of the national
vote went against the republic proposal, but in country areas the `No' vote was 63%.
In the major cities, Anglo-Celtic working-class communities rejected change, whilst
some blue ribbon conservative electorates and trendy Labor enclaves voted `yes'.
``Residents of the prosperous and trendy suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne tended to
vote strongly `Yes'...'' (Metherell, 1999). The `indirect election' model was popularly
regarded as a product of elite tastes; in short, a trivialisation of power that only the
powerful could conceive. [``Those who feel they are in touch with the power elites are
quite relaxed about an elitist model of appointment'' (Mackay, 1999, page 1).]
Ross Gittins observed how the vote had revealed ``a stark divide between the
economic haves and have-notsöthe self-perceived winners and losers from change''
(1999). As author, David Malouf, saw it, ``a good part of the...`no' was not a vote for
the Queen...but a cry from the heart from those who do not feel like full participants
in the new Australia'' (1999). Social researcher, Hugh Mackay, ventured that the
indirect model was rejected because it seemed to crystallise the sense of powerlessness
of ``people in the bottom half of the economic heap...'' (1999, page 1); an observation
that would rate as a truism, not an insight, in popular discourses. More profoundly,
perhaps, Mackay observed that the naysayers were in fact little interested in constitu-
tional questions, and were more exercised by the legacy of neoliberalism: job insecurity,
regressive tax `reform', and the social consequences of globalisation.
Another referendum question canvassed support for a constitutional `preamble'
that Prime Minister Howard and a coterie of favourites had drafted: it was cast aside
with contempt by over 60% of voters. The original draft of the preamble outraged
feminists and progressives with misty-eyed references to `mateship'and military glories.
Howard also ignored the directive of a national Constitutional Convention held before
the referendum that Aboriginal `custodianship' of the land be acknowledged in any
preamble. After the vote, a senior Aboriginal activist, Kimberley Land Council head
Peter Yu, remarked that the preamble had received its ``just desserts'' from disillusioned
voters: ``We've got to work out what it is that we want to say as Australians, together''
(cited in Kingston, 1999a). Gatjil Djerrkura, the Chairman of the country's peak
Aboriginal representative body commented: ``The preamble, which was meant to be
an aspirational document to unite the nation, had been drafted behind closed doors
without any meaningful consultation with the Australian people. I welcome its
resounding defeat'' (in Kingston, 1999b).
`A very positive negative'
In the wake of the referendum defeat, there was much handwringing and hardlya dry eye
amongst many progressive republicans. The obvious temptation was to blame the
`uneducated and the unwashed' for sabotaging the republic. Many conservative repub-
licans also emphasised the vote in exclusively negative terms. Andrew Robb, the
convenor of the Conservatives for an Australian Head of State remarked that `No'
voters were consumed by anger after two decades of painful political economic change
that had disadvantaged many of them: ``They are bitter...and if they get a chance they
will lash out'' (cited in Metherell, 1999). Leading political commentator, Michelle
Grattan, lamented ``the worryingly widespread cynicism about the political process''
now apparentlyobvious (1999). Did democracyemerge battered and discredited from the
referenda?
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had rejected a model of power not the idea of a republic. The November 6 verdict was
not about the form of power in Australia but about its structure, and in particular, the
asymmetries that increasingly characterise the nation's social and spatial development.
[``It wasn't a vote against change, but against particular changes...'' (Malouf, 1999).]
The decisive hesitancy that greeted the referenda betrays a democratic instinct that can
be traced to the roots of Enlightenment thought (notably Kant's): ``self-confident doubt
is the original expression of scepticism in a civil citizenry'' (Beck, 1997, page 40).
Rendering this dialectic more simply, one local newspaper in a blue-collar suburb of
outer Sydney declared the republic referendum result ``A very positive negative'' (The
Macarthur Advertiser 10 November1999, page 2). In the same newspaper, a local activist
for the `No' vote campaign identified ``one very important lesson'' from the results:
``...anyone who wants to change the system will have to engage average Australia''.
Also rejected was a preamble that one commentator described as a ``muddy,
muddled, clumsy and blatantly ideological document'' (Kingston, 1999a). Electors
were not asked whether a new statement of values could reanimate an ageing constitu-
tion. There is plenty of evidence that voters would support a new preamble if it was
democratically conceived (Kingston, 1999a).
It may be no fancy to conclude that the referenda results herald the stirrings of
democratic renewal in Australia. What was certainly rejected was the notion that any
form of profound change could be approved without ``inclusion, discussion and a sense
of ownership by the people expected to endorse it'' (Kingston, 1999a). The November 6
results reveal not the immunity of power, but its vulnerability. The naysayers were not
seduced by structures of authorityötraditional or progressive. On the contrary, for a
moment they held power by its very throat. A Republic of Australia may have been
deferred on November 6. But this apparent capitulation to tradition may well have
disguised what was in reality a moment of profound subversionöperhaps nothing less
than a declaration of independence from the simple power structures of liberal democ-
racy. History books of the future may mark 6 November 1999 as the day the death
warrant was first read for majoritarian democracy in Australia.
As Australia approaches the end of the second millennium, the consensus that has
long supported its liberal democratic structures appears to be rapidly weakening. (This
is, of course, by no means an exclusively Antipodean phenomenon.) As Beck tells us,
this ``fading of democracy'' (1997, page 46) represents the proliferation of freedom, not
its demise. Here, the `democratic-despotism' of parliamentary rule is undermined and
ultimately supplanted by a radical and proliferating `subpolitics' emerging outside the
spheres of formal power. A renewal of democracy, and its historical twin modernisa-
tion, ensues, though its form cannot yet be readily fixed. Witness the grass-roots
republicanism in Australia that has decided to retain the monarch temporarily, whilst
at the same time dramatically reducing the autonomy of formal political institutions.
The spectre of democratic censure now haunts power as never before. None of this is
haphazard, just as none of it is assured or written. It marks the progressive expansion
of an idea, implanted centuries ago in the human imagination, that power must be
authorised at every step if it is to advance not hinder the cause of freedom.
The Australian people reaffirmed democracy not tradition when they relicensed the
monarchy on November 6. The progressive establishment (and the foreign press) may
seek to belittle the `ragged army' that trampled on their republic dreams, but this is to
misinterpret that public's profoundly democratic aspiration: nothing less than the
remodernisation of a modern society. ``Freedom's children'', as Beck (1998) describes
such dissenters, knowöif inchoatelyöwhat the Englightenment promised them and
they are growing tired of waiting for it.
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All this brings the spotlight back to neoliberalism, the growth model that promised all
or nothing, and in the end delivered neither. Growth, in the narrowest of sensesö
brushing aside any substantive concern with well-beingöhas been achieved but with
enormous social and ecological consequences. The verdict of politics in 1999 is that the
costs of growth greatly outweigh the gains recorded in the prosperous inner city
communities of the major cities and a few select places and regions.
For neoliberals the events of 1999 have revived two dragons thought slain and
buried: politics and space. In this year, these dragons roamed the land again, breath-
ing fire across the achievements of neoliberalism, which suddenly looked flimsy and
tinder dry.
Like its parent ideology, neoclassical economics, neoliberalism rose to fame, pir-
ouetting on the head of a pin. And yet in reality, neoliberalism, like no other political
ideology, deploys space with potent force. Neoliberals long bewailed social democratic
centralism, only to replace it with a ``neo-authoritarian form of centrally imposed
governance'' (Brenner, 1999, pages 443^444). In the age of globalisation, the central-
ising tendencies of unfettered markets are redoubled, tending swiftly to concentrate
capital, including labour power, in cities and larger centres. As in Europe, neoliberalism
in Australia signalled a break with the goal of ``equalising life conditions on a national
scale'' (Brenner, 1999, page 444) that had gone to the core of the political consensus
thrashed out in the wake of the cataclysms of the Great Depression and the Second
World War. Equity of life chances has given way to the (assumed) acceptance of uneven
development as a motive force for economic growth.
``Government by the market'' (Self, 1993) represents a subjection of humanity to the
rule of structureöalways achieved through the contest of power, never inevitably
arrived at. When neoliberalism triumphs, it immediately seeks to reduce politics to
simple consensus assumptions (for example, the supremacy of growth as a political
object), crafted by networks of state and corporate elites. Mandatory electionsöan
unavoidable concession to majoritarian democracyöare assumed to furnish growth
elites with proxy votes for any subsequent measure, however antithetical to obvious
public sentiments. But politics is irreducible; it cannot be distilled, bottled, and left to
age on a dusty historical shelf; a lesson learned again in 1999.
The republic of dissent
Australia, 1999: what a topsy-turvy year. A year in which the `strongman' of Asia was
pinned down and brought to account by a Lilliputian army of battlers, levellers, and
spoilers. This was truly Annus Horribilis for the courts and sovereigns of majoritarian
democracy.Their ``enemy stereotypes'' (Beck,1998)öthe knaves declaiming `Progress'ö
transubstantiated into real and potent political agents. `Simple progress' has always
required faith from its subjects. But now, a newly `civil citizenry'rallied beneath a banner
whose strange mottoöDubito ergo sum!örefused the consolations of tradition and
simple progress. Doubt and dissent replaced the platitudinous certainties long hawked
by elites as the necessary concessions to order, stability, and wealth. That idol of
neoliberal certitudeöthe god of Growthöseemed nearly to topple as this `peasants'
revolt' shook power to its very core. In this strange and most unexpected year, ``free-
dom's children'' shrugged off the ``constructed certitude'' (Beck, 1997) of neoliberalism,
along with its economic and political simplisms, and took the most liberating step
imaginable...into uncertainty.
The monarchy is dead, long live the Queen!
Brendan Gleeson
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